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Abstract
We augment Becker’s classic model of the family by assuming that, in
addition to caring about consumption, the family wishes to further a subjective
story, or narrative, that captures its deeply held values. Our focus is on two
stories that in many ways are polar opposites. The first one—the protector
narrative—gives rise to a type of traditional family where gender roles are
distinct, men and women are pushed towards “separate spheres,” and men
are expected to be tough and authoritarian. The second one—the fulfillment
narrative—gives rise to a type of modern family where roles are less distinct,
family members have greater latitude in their decisions, and marriages are
based to a greater extent on romantic love. We derive a rich bundle of behaviors
associated with each story, and using survey data, we show that our findings
are consistent with a variety of empirical patterns.
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I. Introduction
An American family of a century ago would be downright puzzled by the choices of
many families today. Cohabitation, for instance—once considered highly shameful—
is now commonplace (e.g. Manning and Stykes, 2015). While a century ago most
women were expected to be housewives, today the majority work outside the home.
Single parenthood has also skyrocketed, and as recently as 2015, gay marriage was
legalized. Attitudes today, while different from a century ago, are by no means
uniform: families strongly disagree on issues such as abortion, pre-marital sex, and
gender roles. These patterns may reflect, in part, differences in economic conditions,
but they also seem to originate from more fundamental differences in what families
value.1
In this paper, we augment the classic economic model of Becker (1981) in order
to account for such heterogeneity in attitudes and behaviors. We take the view that,
in addition to caring about standard economic goods, the family wishes to further
a subjective story—or narrative—that captures its deeply-held values.2 Formally,
we model the family as maximizing the sum of utility from consumption and utility
generated from its story. For the most part, we treat the story as exogenously given,
as we are primarily concerned with the impact of narratives on behavior rather than
their origin.3
Our focus will be on two stories that in many ways are polar opposites of each
other. The first story, which we call the protector narrative, produces a type of
traditional family where there are strong gender norms and where members are cast
into two distinct roles: “pure individuals” who are, to varying degrees, kept cloistered
(so as to protect them from the world’s most corrupting aspects); and “protectors,”
who are the main breadwinners of the family, acquire worldly knowledge, and act
tough and authoritarian. This arrangement allows the family to exploit convexities
brought about by the narrative. The second story, which we call the fulfillment
narrative, produces a type of modern family where gender norms are weak and all
adult members hold similar roles.
1See Goldin (1990) for a discussion of the role of changing economic conditions, such as the
increase in women’s education and the expansion of the service sector.
2The stories we consider can be viewed as a source of identity at the family level. In this sense
our work connects to the literature on identity (see especially Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
3See Section IX for a discussion of the family’s choice of narrative.
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The main takeaway of our analysis is that each story leads to a distinctive bundle
of behaviors. Notably, these bundles can include non-economic practices that are
inconsistent with the standard model. For instance, families may sacrifice the careers
and happiness of women for the sake of maintaining their purity (which Betty Friedan
calls “the problem that has no name”); they may underinvest in women’s human
capital and assign members to roles based on gender rather than talent; or they may
forbid children from entering marriages of the same sex.
We open the paper by documenting some stylized facts that serve as motivation
for our analysis. Specifically, we show that families tend to come in distinct types
in the sense that their behaviors (and beliefs) bundle together into rather specific
packages. We then construct our model in steps, by gradually adding complexity to
the family’s objective and choice set. As we add more complexity, we obtain a richer
bundle of behaviors for each family type. Throughout our analysis, we interweave
our theoretical results with empirical applications. Our goal is to illustrate the
applicability of our framework and to bring each of the model’s predictions to life.
Our paper relates to a growing, largely empirical, literature within economics
which argues that culture and norms are critical for understanding families (see,
for example, Guiso et al., 2008, Fernandez and Fogli, 2009, Carvalho, 2012, Alesina
et al., 2013, Bertrand et al., 2015, and Becker, 2018, and see Jayachandran, 2015,
Giuliano, 2018, and Bertrand, 2020, for reviews). These papers show that social
norms and a family’s cultural inheritance have significant impacts on such outcomes
as female labor force participation, divorce rates, and fertility.
There is also a literature outside of economics on “family models” which argues
that families come in well-defined types. For example, Lakoff (1996, 2008) contrasts
a “strict father model,” which prizes obedience in children, with a “nurturant parent
model,” which favors independence; Stiehm (1982) and Young (2003) describe a
model where the (male) head of household has the duty to provide for the family
and protect them from harm.4 These treatments view a family’s type as reflecting
its narrative, as we do. However, these treatments lack a formal model; and they do
not derive patterns of interest from first principles, as we do. In addition, they do
not take a stance on how families with different narratives will respond to changes
4Lakoff suggests that American conservatives largely adhere to the strict father model while
liberals largely adhere to the nurturant parent model. In related work, Cahn and Carbone (2010)
contrast “red families” with “blue families.”
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in their economic conditions.
Also related is recent work in economics that seeks to identify important di-
mensions along which preferences and ideologies differ. For instance, Enke (2019)
argues that societies vary in kinship tightness, with associated differences in moral
values; and Draca and Schwarz (2018) suggest that voters differ ideologically in their
trust in institutions. Notably, as we briefly discuss in the conclusion, our empirical
classification of families correlates with Enke (2019)’s classification of kinship.5
Finally, we contribute to a nascent literature that explores the impact of narra-
tives on various aspects of the economy (see, for instance, Akerlof and Shiller, 2015,
Morson and Schapiro, 2017, Shiller, 2017, Be´nabou et al., 2018, Mukand and Ro-
drik, 2018, Michalopoulos and Xue, 2019, Eliaz and Spiegler, 2020, and Kets and
Sandroni, 2020). To our knowledge, our paper is the first to explore how narratives
affect the family.
Our goal in the paper is to capture some of the heterogeneity in people’s thinking
and motivation in making decisions. In line with the economic tradition of parsimony
in modeling, we aim to capture as much as possible adding as little as possible.
Thus, while we believe our model better captures how people think than a standard
Beckerian model, we do not wish to suggest that all families we term “traditional”—
or all families we term “modern”—think the same or are fully captured by our model.
Note also that our exercise is purely positive: the aim is not to pass judgments.
II. Family Types
This section, for motivation, presents a stylized fact: family behaviors and beliefs
tend to bundle together into specific packages.
Table 1 presents the results of a simple exercise: using data from the General
Social Survey (GSS), years 1977 to 2016, we apply an unsupervised learning algo-
rithm to classify Americans into two types. We use two attitudinal questions to
cluster respondents. These questions respectively concern views on premarital sex
and whether men should work and women should tend home.6
5Another related paper is Bandiera et al. (2020), which classifies CEOs according to their man-
agement style.
6For an extended version of Table 1 and a version with various controls, see Tables S.1 and S.3
in the Online Supplement.
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Table 1: Classification Exercise (GSS)
Variable
(1)
Modern
(average)
(2)
Traditional – Modern
(average)
Sex before marriage: always wrong† -0.661 1.924***
Better for man to work, woman tend home: strongly agree† -0.274 0.796***
Being a housewife as fulfilling as paid work: strongly agree -0.103 0.315***
Bad marriage better than none at all: strongly agree -0.083 0.227***
Homosexual sex relations: always wrong -0.333 0.933***
Can people be trusted: can’t be too careful -0.024 0.071***
Should children be obedient or think for themselves: obedient -0.176 0.491***
Favor spanking to discipline child: strongly agree -0.110 0.328***
Ever married‡ 0.720 0.136***
Age when first child born‡ 24.265 -0.795***
Percentage of same gender in occupation‡ 0.678 0.036***
Have gun in home‡ 0.391 0.066***
GSS respondents are classified as modern or traditional using the k-means algorithm (see Online
Supplement for further details). Questions used to cluster are marked with †. All variables without
‡ have been standardized. Response after the colon (:) corresponds to the largest numeric value
of the variable. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1.
We term the first type of individual “traditional” and the second type “modern.”
On average, traditional types are less accepting than modern types of premarital
sex and are more likely to believe that men should work and women should tend
home (the difference between types is 1.9 and 0.8 standard deviations respectively).
Being a traditional type predicts a variety of other beliefs: for instance, these types
are more likely to believe that a bad marriage is better than none at all, that gay
marriage is wrong, that children should be obedient rather than think for themselves,
and that people cannot be trusted. Type is also predictive of behavior. For example,
traditional types are more likely to be married, to have children at a young age, to be
in gendered professions, to favor spanking their kids, and to own guns; and traditional
women are 38.7 percent more likely than modern women to be housewives (p-value
0.000).7 Over the past four decades, traditional types have become less prevalent:
they constituted only 26 percent of families in 2016 compared to 44 percent in 1977.8
Table 2 performs a similar clustering exercise using World Value Survey (WVS)
data that spans 90 countries. The two types (“traditional” and “modern”) closely
resemble their US counterparts and, as before, a respondent’s type predicts numerous
7See Table S.4 in the Online Supplement.
8See Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
4
Table 2: Classification Exercise (WVS)
(1) (2)
Variable Modern(average)
Traditional – Modern
(average)
If jobs are scarce, men have more right: agree† -0.480 0.783***
Being a housewife as fulfilling as paid work: agree strongly† -0.117 0.188***
Prostitution: never justifiable† -0.783 1.269***
Divorce: never justifiable† -0.821 1.343***
Homosexuals as neighbors: would not like† -0.631 1.030***
Sex before marriage: never justifiable -0.728 1.202***
Homosexuality: never justifiable -0.778 1.263***
Most people can be trusted: can’t be too careful -0.104 0.168***
Unmarried couples as neighbors: would not like -0.313 0.543***
Woman as a single parent: disapprove -0.381 0.613***
Obedience in children: important -0.150 0.244***
Independence in children: important 0.115 -0.183***
Ever married‡ 0.624 0.090***
How many children do you have‡ 1.591 0.481***
WVS respondents are classified as modern or traditional using the k-means algorithm (see Online
Supplement for further details). Questions used to cluster are marked with †. All variables without
‡ have been standardized. Response after the colon (:) corresponds to the largest numeric value
of the variable. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1.
attributes. We also observe substantial cross-country variation in prevalence of types.
For example, the percentage of modern types is 92.4% in Sweden, 65.3% in the US,
47.3% in Chile, and just 0.7% in Jordan. For the full list of countries, see Table A.1
in the Appendix.9
We shall argue that these patterns can be explained by bringing stories into the
family’s objective function.
III. Model
We begin with a simple model (which will be progressively expanded as the paper
unfolds). A family must choose a job for each of its N ≥ 2 members. A job is
described by its wage w, with job w = 0 representing “no work.” Family members
are equally capable, each qualified to work any job in the interval [0, wmax].10 Let wi
9For an extended version of Table 2, see Table S.2 in the Online Supplement.
10We make this assumption in order to emphasize that the differences in individual roles that
arise in our model do not stem from differences in capabilities.
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denote the job selected for family member i; let w denote the average family wage;
and let w0 denote per capita unearned income. Income is split equally across family
members, so each one receives w+w0; and income is devoted entirely to consumption.
The choice of jobs results in an “outcome” Vi for each member. This outcome
has two components:
Vi = u(w + w0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption utility
+ S(wi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
story utility
,
where u(·) is increasing and strictly concave and S(·) comes from the family’s story.
Thus, we take the view that stories are a source of utility, and in particular, they
provide meaning to each occupation.11 For most of our analysis, we treat the family’s
story as exogenously given.
We assume that family members fully internalize each other’s outcomes. Thus,
the family’s objective is to maximize the average outcome:
V = u(w + w0) + S,
where S denotes the average value of S(wi). Observe that V depends upon the
family’s job selection only through the average wage w and average story utility S.12
For a given story of interest, we solve the family’s problem in two steps:
1. Obtain the family’s “production-possibility frontier” (PPF) by finding the max-
imum achievable value of S for every value of w.
2. Find the point (w, S) on the PPF that maximizes V .
We shall begin by solving this baseline model under two alternative stories: the
“protector narrative,” which will give rise to a type of traditional family (Section
IV), and the “fulfillment narrative,” which will give rise to a type of modern family
(Section V). Each story will be captured by a different function S(·).
We will then add further elements to the model in order to obtain a rich bundle
of behaviors for each family type. In particular, we will show how gender norms are
11Story utility differs from a standard Beckerian commodity because it is a side effect of the
family members’ occupational decisions, rather than something family members produce directly.
12If we eliminate story utility from our model, it becomes a Becker-style model in which all forms
of production are fully substitutable.
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shaped by the narrative (Section VI), derive implications for marriage (Section VII),
and explore how the narrative influences the toughness of family members and the
allocation of authority within the household (Section VIII).
IV. The protector narrative
Here we put forward our first story: the “protector narrative.” Informally, it goes as
follows:
Purity (lack of corruption) is valuable and worthy of protection. The
world is a dangerous place, full of corrupting influences.
Ideas of purity and pollution are widespread (see Douglas (1966) and Kristeva
(1980) for seminal treatments, and Haidt (2012) for a discussion of the relationship
between purity and morality). Virtually every culture has specific ideas of what is
“dirty” (some related to health, others quite arbitrary) as well as rituals and prescrip-
tions for avoiding contamination. Sources of pollution may include: menstruation,
childbirth, and death; exposure to “untouchable” individuals; sexual contact; and
immoral acts (e.g. treason or murder), which are often seen as “stains.”13 Purity
may be protected, for example, by veiling, restricted diet, avoidance of the opposite
sex, or maintaining ignorance of certain aspects of the world.
Our interest is on how the choice of an occupation impacts purity. To model
this impact, we equate story utility to purity: associated with each job w, there
is a purity level P (w), and so member i’s outcome is Vi = u(w + w0) + P (wi).
We assume that P (w) is decreasing and convex (P ′ < 0, P ′′ > 0), as illustrated in
Figure 1. (We normalize the minimum achievable purity to zero and denote the
maximum achievable purity by Pmax.) P ′ < 0 captures the idea that higher salary
jobs involve greater exposure to “corrupting elements” (e.g. members of the opposite
sex, knowledge, foreign cultures). P ′′ > 0 captures the idea that purity is (roughly)
all-or-nothing in the sense that even small degrees of exposure are highly damaging.
In the Garden of Eden story, for instance, innocence is lost after just a single bite of
the forbidden fruit.14
13For Kristeva (1980), notions of pollution are closely linked to a distinction between “self” and
“other.” Thus, both bodily secretions and individuals outside one’s group can be considered impure.
14Many Christians believe that not only Adam and Eve but all of their descendents were corrupted
7
Figure 1: The Purity Function
0
efficient frontier = convex hull
Role A
Role B
w
wmax
Pmax
P(w)
A. Occupational Choice under the Protector Narrative
Under the protector narrative, the family’s problem is to maximize:
V = u(w + w0) + P ,
where P is the average value of P (wi). We are now ready to solve this problem.
Step 1: Obtaining the family’s PPF. When the family is large (N = ∞), the PPF
is simply the line segment connecting the two extreme points of the purity function
(i.e. the concavification of the function), as depicted in Figure 2(a). The family
reaches this frontier by splitting its members between two extreme roles: a high-
purity/low-wage role (A) and a low-purity/high-wage role (B). Intuitively, given that
purity is roughly all-or-nothing, exposure to a higher-wage job has diminishing costs.
Consequently, it is best to concentrate all exposure on a subset of family members
and keep the remainder maximally pure.
When instead N is finite the PPF consists of a series of “drapes” (see again Figure
2(a)). To derive it, notice that because exposure has diminishing costs, the family
will still assign at least N − 1 family members to the extreme roles A and B. Thus,
we can trace the PPF by gradually moving members, one at a time, from Role A
to Role B.15 As N grows, the number of drapes grows and the PPF more-and-more
by this original sin. Even newborn babies must be baptized, so the thinking goes, because, young
as they are, they are subject to this taint.
15When N = 2, for instance, we begin by assigning both family members to Role A. Next, leave
member 1 in Role A and gradually raise the wage of member 2 until that member reaches Role B.
This traces the first drape of the frontier. Finally, leave member 2 in Role B and gradually raise
the wage of member 1. This traces the second drape.
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Figure 2: PPF and Family’s Choice
Role A
(w)
PPF (N = 2)
PPF(N=∞)
ole A
Role BDrapes
0 w
Pmax
wmax
P
(a) PPF (N = 2 and N =∞).
(w)
Family’s Choice
Indifference Curve
Role A
Role B
0 w
Pmax
wmax
P
(b) Solution (N =∞).
closely resembles the N =∞ case.
Going forward, we shall focus on the simpler N =∞ case with the understanding
that it merely approximates the more realistic finite case. This simplification helps
improve the exposition and, fortunately, does not have any meaningful impact on
our predictions.
Step 2: Finding the optimal point on the PPF. Once we focus on the N = ∞ case,
the family’s problem boils down to choosing the split of its members between the
two extreme roles. Provided the optimal split is interior, it equates the slope of the
PPF with the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods, as illustrated in
Figure 2(b). In particular, letting µ denote the optimal fraction of family members
in Role B, we obtain:16
µ = 1
wmax
[
(u′)−1
(
Pmax
wmax
)
− w0
]
.
Note that families with higher endowments focus more on purity and less on bread-
winning (µ is decreasing in w0).
16To see why, notice that the slope of the PPF is − Pmaxwmax and the marginal rate of substitution is
− ∂V /∂w
∂V /∂P
= −u′(w + w0). Therefore, the optimum is interior whenever u′(w0) > Pmaxwmax > u′(wmax +
w0). Moreover, in any interior solution, w = (u′)−1
(
Pmax
wmax
)
− w0. The result then follows from the
observation that µ = wwmax .
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Figure 3: 1959 Bell Telephone Advertisement
B. “Separate Spheres”
Although gender is currently absent from the model, for reasons that will become
clear in Section VI, there is a strong tendency for roles to become gendered. Thus,
this simple model helps us understand an ideology that has held sway in many
societies, over many time periods: that women and men should occupy separate
spheres. A woman’s “proper place,” according to this view, is the domestic sphere
while a man’s is the public sphere. In the United States, the separation of spheres
became more pronounced in the nineteenth century, fueled in part by this ideology
and in part by the Industrial Revolution, which led to a rise of work outside the
home.17
A critical component of the ideology—termed the “cult of domesticity” by histo-
rians—is that women should be embodiments of virtue: pious, chaste, and innocent
even to the point of being childlike. Women, in other words, are supposed to oc-
cupy Role A. According to Welter (1966), “the nineteenth-century American man
was a busy builder of bridges and railroads, at work long hours in a materialistic
society...he occasionally felt some guilt that he had turned this new land...into one
vast countinghouse. But he could salve his conscience by reflecting that he had left
behind a hostage not only to fortune, but to all the values which he held so dear and
treated so lightly. Woman...was the hostage in the home.”18
The idea of separate spheres remained widespread in 1950s America. The post-
war boom, according to Cherlin (2014), meant that many working-class families were
17See Welter (1966) and Cott (1977).
18Welter (1966), p. 151.
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able to “attain the middle-class ideal of the male-breadwinner family: husbands doing
most of the earning, and wives focusing on homemaking, child-rearing, and emotional
support.”19 This ideal was widely depicted in television shows, such as “Leave it to
Beaver” and “Ozzie and Harriet,” as well as magazine advertisements (see Figure 3).
C. Comparison with a Labor-Leisure Model
Note that, mathematically, the model we have presented thus far is equivalent to
a Beckerian model where family members specialize into “market production” and
“leisure production.” Two points are worth making. First, protector-narrative fam-
ilies divide into distinct roles—breadwinner and homemaker—because they hold a
particular, subjective story, rather than because of a more fundamental preference
for leisure. Thus, by varying the story, we will be able to account for heterogeneity
across families in the extent of role division. Second, in our telling, Role A’s do not
enjoy having idle time; in fact, absent purity motives, they would choose to work
more. This difference in interpretation will become more and more consequential as
we add greater richness to the family’s problem.
Our interpretation fits with Betty Friedan’s depiction of the 1950s housewife in
The Feminine Mystique. She describes, in particular, a widespread affliction (“the
problem that has no name”): many American housewives, despite being married with
children, living in material comfort, and having plenty of free time, felt dead inside.
Among the upper-middle class women she interviewed, she found that a surprising
number had been hospitalized for depression, took tranquilizers, or had attempted
suicide. In Friedan’s view, these women were suffering from a lack of meaningful
work. As one older woman put it to her: “I think it would be the most wonderful
thing in the world to work, to be useful. But I don’t know how to do anything. My
husband doesn’t believe in wives working.”20
D. Protected Occupations
Some occupations in the economy, such as working on a family farm or teaching in
an elementary school may be attractive, in part, because they involve particularly
low levels of exposure. At the same time, these occupations may not pay especially
19Cherlin (2014), p. 1.
20Friedan (1963), p. 257.
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Figure 4: Protected Occupations
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PPF
P
Role A
0 wL
w
wmax
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well. To formally capture this possibility, suppose family members have access to
two types of jobs, “regular” and “protected” (see Figure 4(a)). We assume that
protected jobs are less damaging to purity but also have a lower maximum wage (wL
as opposed to wmax).
Each family member now faces an (effective) purity function equal to the upper
envelope of the original two. As a result, depending upon the relative attractiveness
of the two types of jobs, the family’s PPF is either: a single line segment connecting
Roles A and B, as before; or two line segments, one connecting Roles A and A′, and
the other one connecting Roles A′ and B, as depicted in Figure 4(b). In the former
case, protected jobs are irrelevant and family members are split between Roles A and
B, as in the baseline model; in the latter case, they are either split between Roles A
and A′, or A′ and B, depending on the family’s preferences.
The new Role A′ (a “protected worker”) is a compromise between purity and
income. This role emerges when either protected work is sufficiently appealing (i.e.
either wL or P (wL) are high), or regular work is sufficiently unappealing (i.e. either
wmax or P (wmax) are low), or some combination of the two.
Broadly speaking, we can think of “protected work” as work, or other valuable
activities, carried out under a set of restrictions, such as working only with children
or with people of the same sex. An important example of such a restriction is wearing
a veil. We shall discuss this practice in Section VIII.
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V. The fulfillment narrative
We now put forward our second story: the “fulfillment narrative.” Informally, it goes
as follows:
Fulfilling individual desires is important. The world is full of opportunity.
This narrative shifts emphasis away from ideas of purity and corruption; instead,
it encourages the pursuit of individual desires and views the outside world as a place
where these desires can be fulfilled. At a deeper level, this narrative emphasizes
“naturalness” over “purity.” Desires, being part of one’s nature, are seen as valid.21
In the United States, the fulfillment narrative shot to prominence in the 1960s
and was the impetus behind the period’s countercultural movements, including the
Women’s Movement and the Hippie Movement. This period marks the rise of “late
modern” or “post-modern” thought, which emphasized personal expression over act-
ing out socially imposed roles (see Bellah et al., 1985. Giddens, 1991, Bauman,
1992, and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).22 Psychotherapists, for instance, draw-
ing on the work of Carl Jung, Donald Winnicott, and Erik Erikson, encouraged “self
realization” and the search for one’s “true self.”
Friedan, a student of Erikson’s, ignited the Women’s Movement with The Fem-
inine Mystique. In her thinking, rather than being boxed into a homemaker role,
women needed to be free to find their true selves through careers—and thereby ob-
tain a measure of fulfillment. The Hippie Movement, likewise, encouraged people
to get in touch with their true natures. Hippies saw traditional roles (A and B) as
“square.” They invited people, in the words of Timothy Leary, to “turn on, tune in,
and drop out”—to eschew the rat race, engage in artistic and sexual experimentation,
harmonize with nature, engage in communal living, and use recreational drugs.23
21The protector narrative takes the opposite view of human nature. For instance, in St. Au-
gustine’s interpretation of the Garden of Eden story, man’s very nature is corrupted by Adam and
Eve’s original sin: a schism (“concupiscence”) opens between what man naturally longs for and
what is virtuous. Thus, man’s nature must be denied.
22Bellah et al. (1985) contrast an older form of American individualism (“utilitarian individual-
ism”), which emphasized the pursuit of materialistic ends, with a newer form—ascendant in the
1960s—that placed emphasis on self discovery. Benjamin Franklin, with his expression “early to
bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise,” is emblematic of utilitarian indi-
vidualism while the writings of Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau are early examples of the latter
form.
23Steven Spielberg’s classic 1977 film Close Encounters of the Third Kind dramatizes the challenge
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In recent years, notions of fulfillment have fueled the rise of “workism”—particularly
among the rich and college-educated. Mirroring Friedan, workism emphasizes career
as the primary source of identity and meaning in one’s life. As noted by Derek
Thompson (2019) in The Atlantic, rich college-educated millennials “are reared from
their teenage years to make their passion their career and, if they don’t have a calling,
told not to yield until they find one.” Consequently, in the words of Robert Frank
(2007), “for many of today’s rich there is no such thing as ‘leisure’ in the classic
sense—work is their play.”24
Because jobs differ in their opportunities for fulfillment, the fulfillment narrative
has important consequences for career choice. There are a variety of views regarding
the aspects of an occupation that matter most for fulfillment. For Friedan, fulfillment
is closely related to professional achievement; for the hippies, it derives more from
personal enrichment, social impact, and enjoyment; and for some millennials it may
be a combination of all of these factors. Regardless, some form of work or engagement
with the world is necessary to be fulfilled; at the same time, a remunerative career,
in and of itself, lacks meaning. The pursuit of fulfillment therefore rationalizes a
woman’s choice of a legal career over marrying young and having children, or a
college graduate’s choice of an academic career over a more lucrative one.
In terms of our model, we equate story utility with fulfillment: associated with
each job w, there is a fulfillment level F (w), and so member i’s outcome is Vi =
u(w+w0) +F (wi). We assume that F (w) has a concave, inverse-U shape, as shown
in Figure 5(a). The increasing portion of F (w) captures the idea that an occupation
is important for fulfillment. The decreasing portion reflects the idea that the most
lucrative occupations are not typically the most fulfilling.
that the fulfillment narrative poses to the traditional 1950s-style family. It tells the story of Roy
Neary, an unhappily married father of three who, like Friedan’s housewives, feels trapped in a role
that does not suit him. A unique-looking mountain that Neary becomes obsessed with after a close
encounter with a UFO is the symbol for his unfulfilled desires. Neary’s decision to build a replica
of the mountain in the family’s living room, out of dirt from the garden, represents his embrace of
his desires—and its polluting effect on the home.
24Indeed, the richest married men (those in the top decile) had the shortest workweek in 1980
but, by 2005, had the longest (see McGrattan and Rogerson, 2008).
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Figure 5: Occupational Choice under the Fulfillment Narrative
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(b) Solution.
A. Occupational Choice under the Fulfillment Narrative
Under the fulfillment narrative, the family’s problem is to maximize:
V = u(w + w0) + F ,
where F is the average value of F (wi).
As shown in Figure 5(b), the family’s PPF is equal to the fulfillment function
(since it is already concave). The family reaches any given point (w,F ) on the
frontier by assigning all family members to the same intermediate-wage role. Thus,
provided the solution is interior, the optimal (single) role solves the following first-
order condition:25
F ′(w) = −u′(w + w0).
Observe that the optimal role has a positive wage (w > 0): there is no reason to
assign family members to job w = 0, which is both less fulfilling and less lucrative
than intermediate-wage jobs. This positive wage may literally represent money, but
it may also represent some other commodity valued by the family, such as acquiring
knowledge.26
25If u′(wmax + w0) + F ′(wmax) > 0, then the optimal wage is wmax.
26It is not essential for our conclusions that F (w) is everywhere concave or that it has a decreasing
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B. “Individualized Marriage”
Consistent with this simple prediction, the institution of marriage in the United
States has been changing in tandem with the rise of the fulfillment narrative. The
early- to mid-twentieth century’s dominant form of marriage, which Cherlin (2009)
calls “companionate,” is being replaced by a more egalitarian form, which he calls
“individualized,” where husbands and wives occupy similar roles. In an influential
study, Cancian (1987) examines how the marital advice in magazines such as Mc-
Call’s and Ladies’ Home Journal has changed. With increasing frequency, she argues,
this advice has emphasized individual fulfillment and role flexibility: “Through most
of the twentieth century, there has been a trend towards more fluid, androgynous
family roles and more involvement in self-development and personal life. Americans
have become more concerned with individual happiness and pleasure, more tolerant
of alternative life styles, more committed to equality for women and men.”27,28
VI. Gender Norms
There is an extensive literature suggesting that gender norms—and even our very
conceptions of gender—are, to a large extent, socially constructed (for a survey, see
Cherlin, 2017, Chapter 3). As such, gender norms differ across and within societies,
and they change over time.29
Here we begin to enrich our model by incorporating the impact of norms. We
first take norms as given and explore how they affect the family’s decisions; we then
endogenize them and argue that narratives play a critical role in determining these
norms.
For modeling purposes, we restrict to the case of binary gender identities (“male”
portion. If F (w) was not everywhere concave, mixing might take place between more fulfilling and
more lucrative jobs; but, importantly, all family members still have an occupation.
27Cancian (1987), p. 30.
28One indicator of American marriages becoming more egalitarian is men doing more of the
housework (see Kan et al., 2011).
29Within economics, there is a large literature showing that gender norms differ across societies
and profoundly shape behavior, influencing for example, competitiveness (e.g. Niederle and Vester-
lund, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2009), education (e.g. Guiso et al., 2008; Carlana, 2019; Dossi et al.,
2019), self-confidence (e.g. Bordalo et al., 2019), labor force participation (e.g. Algan and Cahuc,
2007; Bursztyn et al., 2020), and entrepreneurship (e.g. Field et al., 2010). See Giuliano (2018)
and Bertrand (2020) for reviews.
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and “female”) and abstract away from any biological differences across individuals.
We take as our primitive assumption that individuals have a desire to “fit” their
respective genders. Therefore, if a particular activity is perceived of as “male,” men
will have a desire (at the margin) to engage in that activity and women will have
a desire (at the margin) to shy away from it. This assumption is standard in the
economic literature on identity (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). To endogenize
gender norms, we further assume that activities are perceived of as more “male”
(“female”) when more men (women) engage in them.
This enriched model will make two core predictions. First, protector families will
assign genders to roles according to a pecking order; by contrast, fulfillment families
will follow no such order as all members occupy fundamentally the same type of
intermediate-wage role. Second, in equilibrium, gender norms will be stronger—and
gender differentiation greater—in protector families than in fulfillment ones.
A. Modeling Gender Norms
Suppose that in addition to caring about consumption and story utility, the family
cares about the “gender fit” Φi of each of its members. To capture the idea that fit
is both about being like one’s own gender and unlike the opposite gender, we set
Φi = − 12 (wi −Wi)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
distance from own gender
+ 12 (wi −W−i)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
distance from opposite gender
,
where Wi denotes the average wage in the broader population of people of the same
gender as i and W−i denotes the average wage of people of the opposite gender.
Assuming the broader population is half male and half female, this gender fit
simplifies to:
Φi = ∆i · wi −∆i ·W,
where ∆i = Wi−W−i is defined as the gender wage differential from the perspective
of person i and W is defined as the average wage in the overall population. Notice
the following properties:
1. Φi is linear in wi. As a result, in contrast to S(wi), gender fit does not add
concavity/convexity to the family’s objective.
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2. Φi is increasing in wi for the gender with the higher wage (∆i > 0) and decreas-
ing in wi for the gender with the lower wage (∆i < 0). Hence, any non-zero
wage differential motivates family members to specialize along gender lines.
3. The marginal impact of wi on Φi, which measures the strength of gender norms,
depends only on the gender wage differential. As this differential grows, norms
become stronger and family members have greater motive to specialize along
gender lines.
Observe that the behavior that maximizes gender fit is extreme in nature. For
instance, assuming men earn more than women, their gender fit is greatest when
they earn the maximum possible amount (wmax) rather than the average amount for
their gender. This constitutes a drive towards hyper-masculinity and femininity, and
may in practice apply to other features besides earnings.
The outcome Vi of each family member is now:
Vi = u(w + w0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from consumption
+ S(wi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from story
+ λ · Φi︸︷︷︸
gender fit
,
where the parameter λ ≥ 0 denotes the importance of gender fit. We will refer to
the sum of the second and third terms as “net story utility.”
B. Single Family’s Problem
Consider a family that takes the wage differential in the overall population as given
and best responds to it. For concreteness, we assume that males earn more than
females on average so the male-female wage differential, denoted ∆, is positive.
Protector Narrative. Figure 6(a) plots the purity function (P (w)) and the “net purity
functions” (P (w) + λ · Φi(w)) for each gender. Notice that the net purity functions
are rotations of P (w) (clockwise for women and counter-clockwise for men). Figure
6(b) depicts gender-specific PPFs (i.e. PPFs for families where all members are the
same gender) as well as the PPF for a generic family composed of both men and
women.30
30The generic family PPF is traced as follows. First, assign all members to Role A. This delivers
point I, which is a weighted average of points a and b on the gender-specific PPFs. The weights
are determined by the fractions of men and women in the family. Next, gradually move men from
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Figure 6: Gender Norms and the Protector Narrative
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As before, the family splits its members between Roles A and B. In addition,
because of its desire to adhere to gender norms, it follows a pecking order in the
assignment of roles, whereby women are assigned to Role A before men and men are
assigned to Role B before women.
This model is akin to a Ricardian trade model where each gender represents a
country and a planner wishes to maximize the average welfare of the two countries.
In this model, men have a comparative advantage at wage production while women
have a comparative advantage at purity production. Because of these comparative
advantages, men are assigned to Role A only after every woman has been assigned to
Role A, and women are assigned to Role B only after every man has been assigned
to Role B.
Observe that point II on the PPF, where there is a perfect gender split across
roles, is a kink point. Thus, because of bunching, a significant fraction of families
may opt to assign all women to Role A and all men to Role B.
Observe also that, because of the pecking order, the death of a husband (or, more
generally, a decline in the family’s male share) constitutes a negative income shock
and a positive purity shock. Consequently, the family optimally reacts by assigning
(weakly) more women to Role B. Assigning women to Role B is not without cost,
Role A to B until all men are assigned to Role B. This traces the line segment connecting points I
and II. Point II on the PPF is a weighted average of points a and c on the gender-specific PPFs.
Finally, gradually move women from Role A to Role B, until all family members are assigned to
Role B. This traces the line segment connecting points II and III. Point III is a weighted average
of points c and d on the gender-specific PPFs.
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however, as it violates gender norms. In line with this idea, many traditional societies
make special allowances for widows. For instance, in Medieval Europe, while women
were not normally permitted to enter guilds, an exception was made for widows
wishing to take the place of deceased husbands (referred to as Witwenprivilegien in
Germany). In early modern Castile, according to De Backer (2010), p.111, “Women
regularly set up independent households upon widowhood and took on the duties
once accorded their husbands....[they] had enormous potential to wield significant
power in Castilian society.” Yet the chaste widow devoted to prayer and abstinence
was still held up as the ideal (see Bilinkoff, 1999). In his 1523 text The Instruction
of a Christian Woman, for example, Juan Luis Vives advised women to practice
devotion to their husbands even in widowhood: “A good widow ought to suppose
that her husband is not utterly dead but liveth both with life of his soul, which is
the very life, and beside with her remembrance.”31
Fulfillment Narrative. Analogous to the protector case, the “net fulfillment functions”
for each gender are rotations of the original F (w) function. Figure 7 depicts gender-
specific PPFs (i.e. PPFs for families where all members are the same gender) as well
as the PPF for a generic family composed of both men and women.32
As in the protector case, the model is akin to a trade model where each gender
represents a country and a planner wishes to maximize average welfare. What differs
is that we now have concave production frontiers (as in a Hecksher-Ohlin model).
Hence, it is optimal to equate the marginal rates of transformation (i.e. the slopes
of the PPFs) across genders.
Along the PPF there is some degree of differentiation between the genders—but it
is not extreme. Indeed, all family members still occupy the same fundamental role,
with each producing a combination of fulfillment and wages. The reason is that,
while gender fit considerations push towards gender specialization, the fulfillment
narrative pushes against it.
31As quoted in Todd (1999), p. 69.
32The gender-specific PPFs are equal to the gender-specific net fulfillment functions (given that
the concavification of a concave function is the function itself). Each point on the generic PPF is
obtained by taking a weighted average of points of equal slope on the gender-specific PPFs. For
instance, point I in Figure 7 is a weighted average of points a and b. (When it is not possible to
equate the slopes, at least one gender will be at an extreme.) As a result, the family’s PPF is also
concave, with a peak at an intermediate wage.
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Figure 7: Gender Norms and the Fulfillment Narrative
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C. Population Equilibrium
Here we propose a way to endogenize the wage differential ∆ and argue that protector
societies will be prone to larger differentials—and therefore stronger gender norms—
than fulfillment ones.
Suppose there is a large population of identical families and let BR(∆) denote the
wage differential that arises inside these families when they best respond to a given
population differential ∆. An equilibrium differential is any ∆ such that BR(∆) =
∆.
Propositions 1 and 2, whose formal proofs are in Appendix B, show that the
protector narrative can generate much stronger gender norms. These propositions
restrict attention to “stable equilibria” that are robust to small perturbations in ∆.33
Proposition 1. Suppose all families hold the protector narrative and suppose that,
absent gender fit considerations, they choose an interior solution where they assign
members to both Roles A and B. Then, every stable equilibrium has a positive wage
differential.
In protector societies, a zero wage differential cannot be a stable outcome because,
owing to the pecking order, any initial nonzero wage differential in the population
33To define such equilibria, assume that families live for many periods, with each period repre-
senting a generation, and the wage differential at time 0 is ∆0. In each subsequent period, families
best respond to the previous period’s wage differential, so that the wage differential at time t is
∆t = BRt(∆0). We then say that an equilibrium ∆∗ is stable if, for all ∆0 close to ∆∗, the wage
differential converges to ∆∗ as t→∞.
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(no matter how small) induces a sizable wage differential inside each family, which
is then further magnified as families react to it.
Proposition 2. Suppose all families hold the fulfillment narrative and let w∗ denote
the optimal wage absent gender fit considerations. Then, there is a stable equilibrium
with zero wage differential provided:
λ < −F ′′(w∗)/4.
The inequality in the proposition is met when the curvature of the fulfillment
function is large relative to the family’s concern about gender fit λ. This inequality
highlights the tradeoff faced by fulfillment families: while gender fit considerations
push towards gender specialization, the curvature of the fulfillment function pushes
towards a common wage for all members. When the second force dominates, families
react to small population wage differentials with even smaller differentials of their
own. Consequently, a zero wage differential is stable.
Societies might also be composed of both protector and fulfillment families. In
such cases, we shall assume that gender norms are narrative-specific: protector fami-
lies (respectively, fulfillment families) look primarily at the gender wage gap in other
protector (fulfillment) families. This captures the idea that people compare them-
selves most with people they frequently interact with, and that these people tend to
share the same narrative (see Section IX for further discussion).
As documented by Goldin (2014), the roles of men and women in the United
States appear to be converging. Our finding that gender norms are weaker under
the fulfillment narrative, combined with the increasing prevalence of this narrative,
may help account for this finding. Below, we present some other results that are
consistent with our predictions.
D. Labor Force Participation
Figure 8 shows the relationship across countries between earning potential (as mea-
sured by GDP per person employed) and labor force participation, with a separate
panel for each gender. Making use of our WVS clustering exercise, we have sorted
countries into three equal-size groups according to their share of traditional types
(most traditional, medium traditional, least traditional).
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Figure 8: Labor Force Participation
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(b) Male.
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Figure 9: Relationship between Narrative and Income
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In the most traditional countries (red), for both women and men, as earning
potential grows labor force participation falls. Moreover, the fall is much sharper
for women than it is for men. This finding is consistent with an income effect,
which allows the family to assign more members to Role A as Role B’s earn more,
in combination with a pecking order, which prioritizes assigning women to Role A.
In contrast, in the most modern countries (blue), this negative relationship vanishes.
The lack of a negative relationship is consistent with work being a source of fulfillment
for modern families, which makes labor force participation less subject to an income
effect.
Observe also that female labor force participation is on average higher in modern
countries than in the wealthiest traditional countries. This result is also consistent
with our model: in wealthy traditional families women can afford to occupy Role A,
whereas in modern families work can be attractive regardless of wealth.34
Notably, modern countries tend to be wealthier than traditional ones. This can
be seen in Figure 8 and, in greater detail, in Figure 9. We shall return to this point
in Section IX, where we consider the endogenization of narratives.35
34Bertrand (2020) argues, like we do, that a country’s cultural views are correlated with female
labor force participation. She finds, in particular, that more sexist countries have lower female
labor force participation. Our approach differs in how we measure cultural views and how these
views affect not just the level of female labor force participation but also its slope.
35As first noted by Boserup (1970) and Goldin (1994), the overall relationship between female
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E. Gender in Professions
Gender norms in our model arise specifically around earnings; but one can equally
imagine them arising around occupations, with some occupations considered more
male and others more female.36
Table 1 (Section II) showed that traditional individuals are in professions where,
on average, more people are of the same gender, which is suggestive of their facing
stronger gender norms. To further illustrate this finding, consider nurses in the
US. In our GSS sample, the vast majority (95%) are female, and among the small
minority of male nurses, the vast majority (90%) are modern. By comparison, only
63 percent of female nurses are modern. At the other extreme, the vast majority of
firefighters (84%) are male, and all female firefighters in our sample are modern. In
contrast, only 59 percent of male firefighters are modern.
It is no coincidence, in our view, that in the classic 2000 comedy Meet the Parents,
the main character Gaylord Focker is a sensitive male nurse. The film concerns a
clash of narratives that ensues when Focker, with his modern sensibility, meets for
the first time his fiance´e’s traditional father, a tough CIA agent intent on protecting
his daughter.
VII. Marriage
Here we continue to enrich the bundle of behaviors associated with each narrative by
considering marriage. Suppose that a pair of individuals who hold the same narrative
and have the same earning potential must decide whether to marry. If they do, each
receives a payoff of V +α, where V denotes the pair’s average outcome and α denotes
an “affinity” payoff. If they instead stay separate, individual i receives the autarky
payoff Vi. For now, we assume individuals do not care about adhering to gender
labor force participation and income is U-shaped. Figures 8(a) and 9 suggest that taking the
narrative into consideration may be useful in accounting for this shape. Goldin (1994) has proposed
that, as income rises, women may first work less due to an income effect and then work more due
to greater availability of attractive jobs (e.g. those in the service sector). Our model suggests that
narratives may also play a role.
36For example, for a protector family, an intermediate-wage job such as a nurse or schoolteacher
might be viewed as protected work, making it prone to be female-gendered. By contrast, for
a fulfillment family, this same job might simply be viewed as a fulfilling one for both men and
women, making it less prone to be gendered.
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norms (λ = 0).37
Observe that the pair may choose to marry both because of the affinity term and
because of potential gains from specialization. In fulfillment families, where there
is a single role and therefore no gains from specialization, marriage takes place if
and only if the pair has positive affinity (α > 0). By contrast, under the protector
narrative, where such gains do exist owing to the existence of different roles, the
affinity threshold for marriage is negative. Proposition 3 summarizes.
Proposition 3. Suppose individuals do not care about gender fit. Then:
1. Under the fulfillment narrative, marriage occurs if and only if there is positive
affinity: α > 0.
2. Under the protector narrative, provided married individuals adopt an interior
solution, the affinity threshold for marriage is less than zero.
The lower affinity threshold for marriage under the protector narrative is con-
sistent with our empirical finding that traditional individuals have higher marriage
rates. In the GSS sample, traditional types are 13.6 percentage points more likely to
be married, and in the WVS sample, traditional types are 9 percentage points more
likely to be married (see Tables 1 and 2).38
Figure 10 shows that husbands and wives have a smaller average age difference
in more modern countries. Our model can help explain this finding: under the
fulfillment narrative, where affinity is the sole basis for marriage, we would expect
to see a smaller average age gap if, as seems likely, age gaps reduce affinity.
In line with Proposition 3, scholars argue that romantic love has only recently
come to be seen as a proper basis for marriage. According to Cherlin (2017): “To
most...nineteenth century women and men, marrying someone because of strong ro-
mantic feelings was considered risky. Passionate, romantic love was thought to be
37We do not attempt to model the distinction between marriage and cohabitation. One key
difference, of course, is that marriage is a long-term contract (see Matouschek and Rasul, 2008). It
is plausible that marriage also involves more internalization of the partner’s outcome (Vi)—or, put
differently, more of a common family identity. A benefit of cohabitation may be that it allows a
couple to share affinity (α) without internalizing each other’s outcomes.
38Even after controlling for income, age, gender, education, and year, the difference in mar-
riage rates between traditional and modern types is highly significant (see Table S.3 in the Online
Supplement).
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Figure 10: Age at First Marriage (Men-Women)
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a base emotion that faded quickly, leaving little support for the couple.”39 Further-
more, the modern system of dating—which shifted power in matchmaking away from
parents—only became widespread in the early to mid twentieth century (see Bailey,
1988 and Modell, 1989).
A. Gender Norms and Marriage.
Gender norms create additional gains from specialization and so may serve as an
additional reason to marry. The reason is that men and women best meet their
norms by differentiating.
These gains are especially large under the protector narrative where norms are
stronger. Indeed, if gender norms require women to stay home and require men to
work, then to meet these norms, a woman needs a man to provide income and a man
needs a woman to provide purity.40
There are some important exceptions, however, where gender norms instead act
39See Cherlin (2017), p. 182.
40Consistent with a pressure to conform to gender norms, Bursztyn et al. (2017) find that single
female MBA students, to make themselves more marriageable, try to appear less ambitious; and
Murray-Close and Heggeness (2018) show that households where the wife earns more than the
husband have a tendency to deflate the wife’s and inflate the husband’s earnings.
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as an impediment to marriage. Two examples follow.
Crisis of Masculinity. While there has been a general decline in marriage in the
US, there has been a particularly pronounced decline for the working class: the mar-
riage rate of men aged 40-44 with high school education or less has dropped by more
than 20 percentage points over the past forty years, compared to 6 percentage points
for those with college education (see Coile and Duggan, 2019). Recent empirical
work suggests this large decline is linked to deteriorating labor market outcomes.
For example, Autor et al. (2018) and Bertrand et al. (2015) show a causal impact
on marriage, respectively, of declines in manufacturing employment and shocks that
reduce the ability of men to out-earn women.41
Our model provides one possible explanation. Among protector individuals, who
are subject to strong gender norms, a man with low earning potential is an unattrac-
tive marriage partner because he performs “poorly” in both roles (in Role B because
of his low earnings, and in Role A because he is not considered sufficiently “manly”).
Indeed, if the earning potential (wmax) of a given man is weakly below that of his
prospective female partner, and weakly below the average earnings of their peer
group (W ), then the net purity function of this man lies strictly below that of his
prospective partner; thus, absent a sufficiently large affinity gain, she will be better
off not marrying him.
This explanation is in line with a large literature in sociology which argues that
working class men are suffering from a “crisis of masculinity.” Manufacturing jobs
that allowed men to be the main providers for their families were an important source
of dignity and respect (see Komarovsky, 1964, Rubin, 1976, Halle, 1984, and Lam-
ont, 2000). Sociologists argue that the absence of such jobs, and the corresponding
challenge to male identity, has profoundly impacted these men’s relationships (see
Edin and Nelson, 2013 and Cherlin, 2014). Our model suggests that the decline of
manufacturing poses a particular threat to traditional families because gender norms
make it hard for men and women to share the family’s breadwinning responsibilities.
Same-sex marriage. In both the GSS and WVS samples, traditional types are
considerably less tolerant of homosexuality than modern types. In the GSS sample,
for instance, traditional types are more likely to say homosexual relations are wrong
(difference of 0.93 standard deviations, p = 0.000) and more likely to oppose gay
41According to Binder and Bound (2019), between 1973 and 2015, real earnings of 25-54 year-old
high-school-educated men have declined by 18.2 percent in real terms.
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marriage (difference of 0.95 standard deviations, p = 0.000).
In line with these patterns, our model suggests that protector-narrative marriages
will produce lower gains from specialization, other things equal, when the couple is
of the same sex. This is because once the couple specializes into Roles A and B,
as favored by the narrative, one member must violate a gender norm. Thus, while
gender norms create gains from specialization for heterosexual couples, they have the
opposite effect for same-sex ones.
VIII. Additional Behaviors
So far we have shown that family members will occupy very different roles depending
on their family’s narrative and wealth and also, within protector families, depending
on their gender. Associated with these different roles may be a variety of addi-
tional behaviors that are not yet part of the model. Here we consider two specific
examples.42
A. Toughness and authoritarianism.
There is a type of purity-impacting human-capital investment that is akin to vacci-
nation. Investments of this sort expose the individual to pollution, but at the same
time, they offer protection against further corruption and loss of purity. Examples in-
clude learning to be tough (e.g. how to fight, shoot a gun, or speak in a commanding
tone), sexual education, and learning about how the world works (e.g. how to man-
age finances or choose a marriage partner). Since these investments are themselves
polluting, they lower purity in low-wage jobs; but since they are protective against
further corruption, they raise purity in high-wage jobs, which are more exposed.
We model such investments, which we broadly refer to as investments in “tough-
ness,” as a counter-clockwise rotation of the purity function for the particular family
member making the investment, as shown in Figure 11(a). Each member may now
choose between two purity curves (the one with and the one without the investment)
and hence faces an effective purity function equal to the upper envelope of these
42These examples merely scratch the surface in terms of analyzing the rich bundle of behaviors
that may accompany each type of role. Section X provides some ideas for how to further enrich
these bundles.
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Figure 11: Toughness
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two curves. Figure 11(b) depicts this upper envelope as well as the solution to the
protector family’s problem for the baseline case without gender norms. As before,
the solution involves splitting members between Roles A and B; on top of that, Role
B’s (but not Role A’s) will choose to become tough. Moreover, when we add gender
norms to the model, and thus a pecking order, it will be men who on average invest
more in toughness.43
Ideas of toughness are embedded in the concept of being “macho.” Macho, which
literally means “male” in Spanish, is often defined as an exaggerated masculinity.
Integral characteristics include strength, courage, and bravery (e.g. Mirande´, 2018).44
Men in fulfillment families have less reason to be tough as purity is not a con-
cern. Consistent with this idea, Kimmel (2017) notes that running in parallel to the
Women’s Movement was a reaction among men to the traditional macho concept of
masculinity. For instance, the Berkeley Men’s Center fought against having “to live
up to an impossible oppressive masculine image—strong,...unemotional, successful,
master of women.”45 By the same token, women in fulfillment families have less rea-
43This version of the model makes the stark prediction that only Role B’s invest in toughness.
In a richer model, family members in Roles A and A′ may invest in various forms of toughness that
convey occupation-specific benefits, provided these investments are not overly damaging to purity;
along these dimensions, they may be tougher than family members in Role B. For example, a nurse
in Role A′ may be especially tough when it comes to dealing with sickness.
44For a study of additional manifestations of masculinity norms, see Baranov et al. (2020).
45As quoted by Kimmel (2017), p. 185.
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Table 3: Attitudes Towards Sex Education
Sex Education in Public
Schools: Oppose
Traditional 0.0947
(0.103)
Daughters -0.0426
(0.162)
Traditional x Daughters 0.142**
(0.033)
Constant 0.0917***
(0.001)
Traditional + Traditional x Daughters 0.2365***
(0.000)
Sample Size 697
Individual-level logit regression using GSS data. The dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the respondent is opposed to sex education and 0 if the respondent is in
favor. “Daughters” is equal to 1 if the respondent has a daughter and 0 otherwise.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity robust. *** 0.01,
** 0.05, * 0.1.
son to avoid being tough. As a result, we can expect less of a systematic difference
across genders.
Our survey data suggests that toughness investments indeed correlate with nar-
rative. Recall, for instance, that in our GSS sample, traditional types are more likely
to have a gun at home (see Table 1). In addition, Table 3 shows that, among re-
spondents with daughters, traditional types are more opposed to sexual education
than modern types (by 23.65 percentage points). By contrast, among respondents
without daughters, there are no significant differences.46
Authoritarianism. Asymmetries in toughness across family members—particularly
asymmetries in their knowledge—can generate power imbalances. Thus, in protector
families, we can expect that Role B’s will be authoritarian towards Role A’s.47
The “cult of domesticity,” for instance, considered it the job of men to look after
and dictate to women. According to the thinking, a pure, innocent woman is easy
prey for slick tricksters. Thus, women were expected to be submissive and follow
46Innocence has historically been considered a key feminine virtue. For example, Victorian mar-
riage advice books such as Whisper to a Bridge, published in 1851, are notable for their complete
absence of intimate information.
47There is a large literature on bargaining within families, which argues that family members’
power depends upon their outside options (e.g. Manser and Brown, 1980). Power imbalances in
our framework arise regardless of these considerations. In practice, both channels are arguably
important (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006).
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Table 4: Parenting Styles
Dep Var: Authoritarian (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inequality 1.787*** 1.113 1.718*** 1.208 1.718*** 1.188** 1.845*** 2.330***
(0.316) (0.104) (0.313) (0.269) (0.304) (0.104) (0.313) (0.543)
Traditional 2.527*** 2.564*** 2.489*** 2.516*** 2.323*** 2.403*** 2.150*** 2.110***
(0.141) (0.121) (0.153) (0.125) (0.123) (0.111) (0.15) (0.141)
N 31,666 31,666 23,131 23,131 31,367 31,367 32,998 32,998
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
The table performs the same exercise as Table 1 of Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) only with an
additional regressor: whether the respondent is a traditional type. All columns are individual-
level multinomial logistic regressions. Columns (1) and (2) are based on the whole sample; columns
(3) and (4) restrict to parents; columns (5) and (6) control for religiosity; and columns (7) and
(8) use alternative classifications of parenting styles. For full procedural details, see Doepke and
Zilibotti (2017). Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the country level. ***
0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1.
orders (e.g. Welter, 1966). For example, The Young Lady’s Book, published in 1830,
advises its readers: “whatever situation of life a woman is placed from her cradle to
her grave, a spirit of obedience and submission, pliability of temper, and humility of
mind, are required of her.”48
A similar logic suggests that protector families should adopt a more authoritarian
parenting style. Previous work by Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) shows that a society’s
level of income inequality correlates with an authoritarian parenting style.49 In
Table 4, we run a version of their main regression augmented with narrative as an
additional explanatory variable. We find that, in all versions of their specification,
having an authoritarian style is significantly correlated with being traditional, as well
as a country’s level of inequality. Thus, both economics and narrative seem to play
a role.
B. Veiling
Here we revisit our model of protected work (Section IV.D) to think formally about
veiling. Veiling can be viewed as a restriction that increases purity. In Islam, veiling
stems from standards of modesty or Haya. According to Hadith (the sayings of
Muhammad): “Allah...is forbearing, modest and concealing, and He loves modesty
48Hosmer (1854), p. 28.
49Doepke and Zilibotti label parents “authoritarian” if they list obedience as one of the five
qualities most desired in children. They propose that, in more unequal societies, there are greater
returns to effort during childhood; in order to secure this effort, parents will be more authoritarian.
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Figure 12: Veiling
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and concealment” (Sunan an-Nasa’i 406).
Because veiling potentially reduces earnings, it is analogous in our model to
engaging in protected work. Thus, in protector families, those in Role A′ will veil
while those in Role B will not. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the Islamic countries
in our WVS sample, there is a significant positive correlation between the share of
individuals who veil and the share classified as traditional.50
There are many types of veils, ranging from full body coverings that reveal little
of the face (e.g. burqa) to veils that cover large parts of the body but not the face
(e.g. chador) to simple, often colorful, headscarves (e.g. es¸arp). In Carvalho (2012)’s
analysis, an intermediate level of veiling strikes a compromise between the desire to
be out in the world and concern over the approval of one’s family and community.
In our model, there is also a value to having multiple veiling options. Figure 12
presents a version of our protected-work framework with more than one type of veil:
a “light veil” that is less protective of purity but also permits greater earnings, and
a “heavy veil” that is more protective but also more constraining. In this case, two
variants of Role A′ emerge, with the less heavily veiled one also producing higher
earnings. (Of course, there might be more than two veiling options and these options
may or may not reach the PPF.) Notice that Role A can be thought of as a limit
where veiling is very intense and earnings very low. Notice also that as the earning
potential wmax of Role B members grows, the family will tend towards heavier and
50A one percentage point increase in a country’s traditional share is associated with a 2.055
percentage point increase in the share of women who veil (p-value 0.0006, R-squared 0.517).
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heavier veils.
IX. Endogenous Narratives
Throughout the paper, we have treated each family’s narrative as given. Here we offer
a preliminary (and informal) discussion of how families might choose their narratives
in the first place. Specifically, we suggest that two forces—both previously identified
in the literature—may play an important role in this choice (see especially Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2011, and Akerlof, 2017).
The first force (“self esteem”) is a desire to do well relative to other families in
producing story utility, as measured by the family’s own story. That is, a protector
(respectively, fulfillment) family will compare its purity (respectively, fulfillment)
level against that achieved by other families it interacts with, and receive utility
or disutility on the basis of this comparison. Because it is difficult for families to
perform well under both the protector and fulfillment metrics at once, they will tend
to specialize on a single objective and hence adopt a single narrative (protector or
fulfillment, but not both). Other things equal, the chosen narrative will be the one
where the family has a comparative advantage.51
The second force (“peer esteem”) is a desire to be well perceived by peer families,
as measured by the stories of peer families. That is, a family that interacts with
protector (respectively, fulfillment) families will be judged by these families on the
basis of how well it performs along the purity (respectively, fulfillment) dimension,
and will receive utility or disutility on the basis of this judgment. This force, which
can be understood as a desire for acceptance and belonging, pushes families toward
conformity: other things equal, families will tend to specialize on what their peers
happen to value, and hence adopt the same narratives.
If social classes differ on average in their comparative advantages, the first force (a
desire for self-esteem) has the potential to produce class differences in narratives.52 In
line with this possibility, in our GSS sample, modern types have higher socioeconomic
status on average, as measured by a socioeconomic index (0.15 standard deviations
51A very wealthy family, however, may be able to perform well under both narratives at once,
and may therefore choose to hold both. One example would be a wealthy family that opens an art
gallery, which may at once provide protected work and fulfillment.
52Furthermore, if families tend to interact with families of the same class, the second force will
generate within-class conformity, and hence exacerbate these class differences.
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Figure 13: Geographical Variation in Narratives
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higher, p = 0.000), years of schooling (1 additional year, p = 0.000), and individual
income (0.12 standard deviations higher, p = 0.000). One way to rationalize this
pattern is to assume that an individual’s access to high-wage jobs that are also
highly fulfilling is dependent on having high human capital. In this case, on average,
middle- and upper-class families may have an advantage relative to working class
families at generating some forms of fulfillment. A similar mechanism might help
explain the cross-country correlation between narrative and GDP observed in Figure
10 (Section VI.D).
The second force (a desire for peer esteem) has the potential to produce a geo-
graphical clustering of narratives (with close neighbors likely sharing the same nar-
rative). Of course, when income differs across regions, the first force might magnify
this effect. Figure 13 shows geographical clustering from our GSS sample and, anal-
ogously, Table A.1 shows geographical clustering from our WVS sample.
X. Conclusion
Our stories create a rich and distinctive bundle of behaviors for each type of family.
Our first story, the protector narrative, generates two highly gendered roles and
pushes men and women towards “separate spheres”; one role (the breadwinner) is
expected to be tough and authoritarian whereas the other (the pure individual) is
expected to either stay at home or engage in protected work, remain innocent, and
in some cases veil. This story also generates strong pressure to marry—except in
cases of same-sex relationships and cases where men have low earning potential. Our
second story, the fulfillment narrative, generates behaviors that are in many ways
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the polar opposite: roles within the family are far less distinct and gender norms
weaker, there is no particular pressure on men to be tough or women to be innocent,
and marriages are based to a greater extent on romantic love.
Our model, by necessity, remains incomplete. Perhaps most notably, we only
touched on some of the implications of the protector and fulfillment narratives.
Other potential implications include matters of fertility, such as age of child bearing,
quantity-quality trade-offs, and abortion; as well as family formation and disintegra-
tion, including divorce, remarriage, and the use of dowries. While stories, and their
interaction with economic motives, no doubt play a key role in these choices, each
one calls for a judicious treatment of its own.
Also left unexplored are the broader implications of narratives for society. In some
extreme cases, for instance, a protector-style narrative might be used as a justification
for corruption. According to Saviano (2019), among the mafia of southern Italy,
“Even the Fifth Commandment may be suspended...when murder serves a higher
purpose, namely the safeguarding of the clan; in such cases, killing will be understood
and forgiven by Christ by virtue of its necessity.” In a similar vein, Banfield (1958)
argues in his classic study of Chiaromonte, Italy (aka “Montegrano”) that the priority
of protecting one’s clan—which he termed “amoral familism”—impeded sustained
cooperation and public good contribution.
Finally, our two stories capture only a subset of the narratives that exist and
are relevant for understanding families. Moreover, there are a variety of narratives
that are distinct from our two and yet may correlate with them. An example is
Enke (2019)’s distinction between loose and tight kinship societies, which appears
to correlate with the classification in our model. For instance, in our GSS sample,
traditional families are generally less trusting (0.071 standard deviations, p-value
0.000) but more trusting of family (0.117 standard deviations, p-value 0.103); and
Enke (2019) finds that tight kinship is correlated with concern about sexual purity
(see Enke (2019), Figure IV). A richer understanding of the full variety of stories—
and the links between them—is left for future work.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Share of Modern-Type Respondents by Country
Country Share Country Share Country Share
Andorra 94.0% Hong Kong 48.3% Montenegro 24.0%
Sweden 92.4% Chile 47.3% Japan 23.4%
Netherlands 86.1% Serbia 44.1% Albania 22.0%
Switzerland 83.4% Haiti 43.7% Malaysia 21.2%
Norway 82.7% Colombia 43.7% Tanzania 20.9%
New Zealand 78.5% Singapore 42.6% Uganda 20.3%
Germany 78.1% Puerto Rico 41.8% Burkina Faso 18.7%
Australia 77.7% Peru 40.4% Kyrgyzstan 17.5%
United Kingdom 76.9% South Africa 40.2% China 16.8%
France 74.4% Taiwan 39.3% El Salvador 16.0%
Canada 74.1% Poland 38.5% Iran 15.8%
Spain 73.8% Ecuador 38.4% Ethiopia 15.5%
Finland 73.7% Zambia 35.7% Vietnam 15.4%
Uruguay 73.1% Venezuela 35.5% Armenia 15.0%
Czech Rep. 67.0% Ukraine 35.5% Turkey 14.5%
Slovenia 65.7% Philippines 34.3% India 14.4%
United States 65.3% Mali 33.9% Zimbabwe 11.7%
Argentina 65.1% Belarus 33.9% Rwanda 10.9%
Croatia 59.4% Thailand 32.6% Ghana 10.7%
Guatemala 56.2% Romania 32.5% Nigeria 10.4%
Brazil 55.9% Russia 31.8% Libya 9.9%
Cyprus 54.6% Bosnia Herzegovina 31.5% Georgia 9.8%
Italy 54.4% SrpSka Republic 29.0% Algeria 9.8%
Latvia 54.3% South Korea 28.5% Uzbekistan 9.3%
Hungary 53.0% Bosnia 28.3% Indonesia 8.4%
Bulgaria 50.8% Lithuania 28.0% Azerbaijan 8.4%
Dominican Rep. 50.7% Moldova 26.9% Bangladesh 5.3%
Estonia 49.8% Kazakhstan 26.4% Pakistan 4.1%
Slovakia 49.7% Trinidad and Tobago 26.3% Jordan 0.7%
Mexico 49.4% Macedonia 26.2% Egypt 0.2%
WVS respondents are classified as modern or traditional using the k-means algorithm (see Online
Supplement for further details).
37
Figure A.1: Share of Traditional Type in US by Year
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Note: the data in the figure comes from our GSS clustering exercise.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that families assign members to extreme roles and follow a pecking order
when doing so. Consequently, for all ∆ 6= 0, |BR(∆)| is bounded below by min{µ, 1−
µ} · 2wmax > 0, where µ denotes the optimal fraction of family members assigned to
Role B when ∆ = 0. It follows that ∆ = 0 cannot be a stable equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We begin with the case where, absent gender norms, the family’s optimum wage
is interior (i.e. w∗ < wmax). Now suppose the family encounters norm ∆t−1 (without
loss ∆t−1 ≥ 0) and chooses wf , wm for period t. Provided ∆t−1 is small, wf , wm, both
of which are functions of ∆t−1, remain interior and satisfy the following first-order
conditions (which are sufficient because the family’s objective is strictly concave):
u (w + w0) +
1
2F
′ (wf ) = λ∆t−1 and u′ (w + w0) +
1
2F
′ (wm) = −λ∆t−1,
where w = (wf + wm) /2.
Now apply the Implicit Function Theorem and rearrange terms to obtain
 dwf (∆t−1)d∆t−1
dwm(∆t−1)
d∆t−1
 = A−1
 2λ
−2λ
 ,
where
A =
 u′′ (w + w0) + F ′′ (wf ) u′′ (w + w0)
u′′ (w + w0) u′′ (w + w0) + F ′′ (wf )
 .
Because u′′, F ′′ < 0 this matrix has a non-zero determinant, and hence the derivatives
dwf
d∆t−1 ,
dwm
d∆t−1 are well defined. Moreover, when ∆t−1 = 0 we have wf , wm, w = w
∗ and
hence  dwf (∆t−1)d∆t−1
dwm(∆t−1)
d∆t−1
 =
 2λ/F ′′ (w∗)
−2λ/F ′′ (w∗)
 .
Since u′′ and F ′′ are continuous, it follows that whenever ∆t−1 is small, −dwf (∆t−1)d∆t−1
and dwm(∆t−1)
d∆t−1 are each close to −2λ/F ′′ (w∗) , which by assumption is strictly smaller
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than 1/2. Therefore, there exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all small ∆t−1,
d∆t(∆t−1)
d∆t−1
:= d (wm(∆t−1)− wf (∆t−1))
d∆t−1
< 1− δ.
Since ∆t =
∫∆t−1
0 ∆′t(x)dx, it follows that whenever ∆t−1 is strictly positive and
small, ∆t < ∆t−1 (1− δ). As a result, for all small ∆t ≥ 0 we have BR∞ (∆t ) = 0,
as desired.
Finally, the case where w∗ = wmax is very similar. The only difference is that in
this case at least one of the wages wf , wm is always equal to w∗.
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